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Abstract
This paper analyses market competition between two diﬀerent types
of credit card platforms: not-for-proﬁt associations and proprietary sys-
tems. The main focus is on the role of the interchange fee set by not-for-
proﬁt platforms. We show that when the interchange fee is set so as to
maximise the sum of issuers’ and acquirers’ proﬁts, the equilibrium val-
ues of platforms’ proﬁts, of the sum of the fees charged by each platform
and their market shares are independent of the competitive conditions
within the not-for-proﬁt platform and are aﬀected by the strength of
inter-platform competition. We also show that the imposition of a ban
on the setting of the interchange fee has ambiguous eﬀects on the proﬁt
of the proprietary system.
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In the market for credit cards, two types of systems operate: not-for-proﬁt
associations and proprietary for-proﬁt systems. The not-for-proﬁt associations,
like Visa and Master Card, are owned and controlled by members (banks and
other payment card entities) who issue cards to consumers and process the
merchants’ transactions. Often the two payment card entities, those issuing
the card to consumers and those that process the merchants’ transactions are
diﬀerent. The ﬁrst type of entity is called issuer, the second acquirer. All fees
are set and collected by members (issuers and acquirers) directly whereas the
platform is paid membership fees to cover platform related costs. Consumers’
fee can take diﬀerent forms, per-transaction fee, ﬂat fee, two-part tariﬀ and
are paid to the issuing entities. Merchants pay a merchant discount, generally
a percentage of the amount of the transaction, to acquirers.
Also platforms cooperatively set interchange fees; these are fees that ac-
quiring banks pay to banks that issue cards for each transaction between their
respective customers, merchants and cardholders.
The second type of platforms are proprietary, vertically integrated for-proﬁt
organisations that directly issue cards, acquire merchants and set their fees. A
main example of this type of platforms is American Express.
Since 1984, when National Bancard Corporation unsuccessfully sued Visa
claiming that Visa’s interchange fee was an illegal agreement, the business
model of these two types of organisations has been the focus of increasing
attention by economists and regulators and the collective setting of the inter-
change fee by associations is currently under close scrutiny in many countries.
The opportunity of regulation of payment systems, and in particular of in-
terchange fees, has been considered by the Oﬃce of Fair Trading in the U.K.
and, recently, also by the European Commission. In July 2002, the European
Commission1 declared the multilateral settings of the Visa interchange fees a
anti-competitive practice; nevertheless, the Commission has decided to exempt
under the European Union competition rules the multilateral interchange fees
for cross-border Visa card payments, provided that these fees are capped at
the level of relevant costs. The Reserve Bank of Australia has recently pro-
posed to introduce a cost-based regulation of the interchange fees in order to
promote access of banks into credit card associations2.
The literature that dealt with this issue includes Frankel (1998), Evans and
Schmalensee (1999), and Chang and Evans (2000) which discuss arguments for
and against the allegation of price-ﬁxing.
1See European Commission (2002).
2A critical discussion of the arguments put forward by the Reserve Bank of Australia can
be found in Visa (2002).
2The economic literature on this subject is still comparatively small although
the functioning of these markets raises some new interesting questions. The
essential feature of credit card platforms is that they operate on a two-sided
market. The platform enables transactions that are carried out by two sets of
agents, buyers and sellers, whose decisions to join the platform are taken in
an uncoordinated fashion. To be economically viable, platforms have to get
both sides on board: buyers’ beneﬁts from joining a platform are increasing
in the number of merchants where their card is accepted; at the same time
merchants’ beneﬁts from joining are higher the more widespread the use of
the card among consumers3. This type of interactions raises a coordination
problem for the platform owner who has to balance the two sides of the market
so as to maximise the economic value of the platform. This is not the usual
problem faced by imperfectly competitive ﬁrms. Absent these complementari-
ties, ﬁrms usually rise price and restrict output in order to maximise proﬁts; in
two-sided markets, ﬁrms have to price in order coordinate customers’ choices
independently taken on the two sides4.
A small number of recent papers discusses the issues involved in price set-
ting in two-sided markets and analyses the role played by interchange fees in
the credit cards market.
Rochet and Tirole (2001b) develop a model of platform competition with
two-sided markets which is general enough to encompass a number of diﬀer-
ent industries and that extends the results of a previous paper (Rochet and
Tirole, 2001a). For a wide range of governance structures they show how the
pricing structure of ﬁrms operating in two-sided markets is devised so as to get
both sides on board. With competing platforms (either for-proﬁt or not-for-
proﬁt), the optimal price structure depends on the split of total costs between
issuers and acquirers, the demand elasticities as well as the diﬀerent degrees
of competition on the two sides of the market. Schmalensee (2002), analyses
the determinants of the optimal interchange fee set by a single platform under
diﬀerent assumptions about the degree of competition on the issuers’ and ac-
quirers’ side. He derives a decomposition of the optimal interchange fee in two
parts; one depends on the diﬀerences in demand elasticities faced by acquirers
3Evidence on the beneﬁts from credit card usage for buyers includes the possibility to
conclude transactions whether or not the cardholder is known to the merchant, the security
advantages due to the possibility to minimise holding of cash balances, the possibility to do
transactions on-line or over the phone, to make purchases abroad. Merchant beneﬁts include
convenience eﬀects in transactions were the alternative method of payment is more costly
as in on-line sales and mail-order, risk shifting beneﬁts when the risks of fraud or default
are passed to the issuers.
4A general discussion of the economics of two sided markets is in Parker and Van Alstyne
(2000).
3and issuers, the other depends on the cost diﬀerences of the two sides. He
also demonstrates, for the case of linear demands that, the privately optimal
interchange fee corresponds to the socially optimal. More generally, the two
are not equal but there is no clear bias between their levels; this conclusion is
consistent with the results of Rochet and Tirole (2001a, 2001b).
Wright (2002) analyses how the imposition and the lift of the rule, com-
monly found in many platforms, that forbids merchants to charge diﬀerent
prices to customers using diﬀerent means of payment (also known as no-
surcharge rule), aﬀects the platform’s choice of the interchange fee and to-
tal welfare. Absent the no-surcharge rule, if merchants have market power
they will extract surplus from the inframarginal cardholders and consequently
there is underprovision of cards and too little usage. Under these circum-
stances, both the platform and a regulator would prefer the reinstatement of
the rule and will set a common socially optimal interchange fee. Such a fee
can appropriately allocate costs and beneﬁts to cardholders and merchants
under two conditions: merchants have signiﬁcant market power and the no-
surcharge rule is in place. Gans and King (2002) construct a model based on
the assumptions laid out in the reform proposals of the Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia (RBA) and test for the theoretical soundness of the actions proposed by
RBA. They analyse the case of a single platform with a number of competing
issuers and acquirers and show that if two-part tariﬀs are levied by issuers and
acquirers, then the optimal interchange fee is independent of the competitive
conditions on the two sides; if fees are linear, the optimal interchange fee is
increasing in the level of acquirers’ competition and decreasing in the level of
issuers’ competition. Although framed in diﬀerent settings, these models share
the common result that regulation imposing a ban on the interchange fee or a
cost-based mechanism for the determination of buyers’ and merchants’ fees are
very likely to reduce rather than increase social welfare due to the diﬃculties
involved in the determination of the socially optimal interchange fee. Another
common characteristic of the literature reviewed above, is that all models do
not consider explicitly the competition between not-for-proﬁt and for-proﬁt
platforms which, instead, is the primary focus of this paper.
Competition between these two types of platform raises interesting ques-
tions due to their asymmetries. For-proﬁt platforms are vertically integrated
and have two separate instruments, buyers’ and merchants’ fees, and optimise
on both; the not-for-proﬁt platforms have only one instrument at their dis-
posal - the interchange fee - being the other fees the result of intra-platform
competition between its members. Moreover, if we assume that the degree of
diﬀerentiations between platforms is higher than within the same platform, we
might expect the interchange fee to play a role in neutralising the excess of
intra-network competition.
4We analyse what is the role of the interchange fee and how it can be used
by not-for-proﬁt platforms in the competition with a diﬀerent type of platform.
We assume duopolistic competition among platforms and intense intra-
platform competition among issuing and acquiring banks. Using a generalised
Hotelling model we derive a number of results concerning the competitive role
played by the interchange fee, its eﬀect on prices, total output and proﬁts.
Also we study how intra-platform and inter-platform competition aﬀect the
optimal interchange fee.
The main theoretical contribution of this paper is to highlight the diﬀerent
eﬀects of inter-platform as opposed to intra-platform competition on the in-
terchange fee and the immunisation role played by this latter with respect to
the degree of intra-platform competition. When the interchange fee is set so as
to maximise the sum of issuers’ and acquirers’ proﬁts, the equilibrium values
of platforms’ proﬁts, price levels and their market shares are independent of
the competitive conditions within the not-for-proﬁt platform and are aﬀected
by the strength of inter-platform competition. We show how, in equilibrium,
the not-for-proﬁt platform, by appropriately setting its interchange fee, is able
to make its competitive stance against the rival platform independent of its
internal competition.
Variations in the strength of competition, both inter and intra-platform,
aﬀects the level of the optimal interchange fee. An increase in the level of intra-
platform competition, generating either from the issuers’ or the acquirers’ side,
induces a change in the optimal interchange fee that increases the price of the
less competitive side. This implies that if, for example, the acquirers’ side is
less competitive than the issuers’ side, a further increase of competition will
lead to an increase of the optimal interchange fee. If inter-platform competition
is not too asymmetric on the two sides, changes in its level produce the same
eﬀects on the optimal level of the interchange fee as those discussed above for
intra-platform competition.
Finally, we show that banning the setting of the interchange fee does not
necessarily make things better for the for-proﬁt platform.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up the model
of credit card platforms competition and describes consumers’ and sellers’ be-
havior; the main results are derived and discussed in Section 3. In Section 4
we introduce network eﬀects at the individual level and show that the basic
economics of the model remains unchanged. Section 5 concludes.
52 The model
2.1 Assumptions
We model the competition between two credit card platforms. Platform 1 is a
not-for-proﬁt association jointly run by its members; platform 2 is a proprietary
proﬁt maximising platform. In platform 1, the fees charged to buyers and
sellers are independently set by the issuing and acquiring banks respectively.
Platform 1 also sets an interchange fee, denoted by a, which is set so as to
coordinate the two sides of the market. It is customarily assumed that the
interchange fee ﬂows from acquirers to issuers. We adhere to this custom and
we allow a to take positive or negative values.
The objective of platform 1 is to maximise the total value of the network
which is given by the sum of its member’s proﬁts. Without loss of relevance we
simplify the analysis by neglecting any ﬁxed or variable cost directly incurred
by the platform. Without platform costs, the zero proﬁt condition implies that
at platform level the total amount of interchange fees paid by one side exactly
oﬀsets the amount received by the other. In line with the existing literature
we make the simplifying assumption that issuers and acquirers are diﬀerent
entities.
Platform 2 directly sets the fees for the two sides of the market. We restrict
attention to linear per-transaction prices and do not consider two-part tariﬀs.
Although annual fees for cardholders fees are often present, options without
such ﬁxed fees are frequently available and merchants generally face no or very
low ﬁxed fees for accepting cards.
Economic value is created by ”transactions” between pairs of end users,
buyers and sellers; these transactions are mediated by a platform. We assume
that neither buyers nor sellers multihome, so they can be aﬃliated to at most
one platform and that the two populations of buyers and sellers have mass one.
Consider a (buyer, seller) pair; without loss of generality, we can assume that
each such pair corresponds to one potential transaction. Actual transactions
can take place only if both parties are aﬃliated to the same platform.
We also assume that both platforms impose a no-surcharge rule that pro-
hibits merchants to pass some or all of the costs of processing credit cards trans-
actions to those buyers who prefer credit card to cash. Explicit no-surcharge
rules are quite common for associations like Visa and Master Card and, even
when not explicitly forbidden, in many countries surcharging is rarely observed.
The two platforms oﬀer a diﬀerentiated service to both cardholders and
merchants. On platform 1, N issuing banks compete for cardholders and
L acquiring banks compete for merchants. We assume that intra-network
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Figure 1: Flow of funds in not-for-proﬁt platforms
Since they play an important role in our model, it is useful to deﬁne neatly
the two concepts of intra-platform and inter-platform competition. The former
relates to the competitive conditions within platform 1 and it is aﬀected by
the number of issuing and acquiring banks operating on that platform and the
degree of diﬀerentiation in the services they provide. The latter concept relates
to the degree of competition between the two platforms on both sides of the
market. The intensity of competition depends on the degree of substitutability
between the two platforms.
Figures 1 and 2 graphically summarise the ﬂows of funds within the two
platforms.
The timing of the model is the following: in the ﬁrst stage platform 1 sets
its interchange fee, in stage 2 market competition takes place between member
banks and platform 2 which compete on prices. Since the interchange fee is
ﬁxed by the association only periodically, it is natural to assume that a is
set before aﬃliated banks compete in prices. We assume that side payments
between issuing and acquiring banks are not allowed; this implies that the
optimal interchange fee is constrained in the interval [¡cA;cI] to ensure non
negative proﬁts for member banks.
Both sides of the market are described using a variation of the standard
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Figure 2: Flow of funds in for-proﬁt platforms
length segment. Buyers and sellers are uniformly distributed along the line
representing each side of the market.
2.2 Intra-platform competition on platform 1
Issuers compete for cardholders while acquirers compete for merchants. The
fee charged to cardholders and merchants are set independently by member
banks.
Issuers and acquirers have constant marginal costs denoted by cA and cI
respectively5. Considering the interchange fee, total per transaction costs be-
come:
cA + a; cI ¡ a (1)
For later use, let deﬁne the platform total per transaction cost: c = cI + cA.
Aﬃliated banks on the two sides of the market are little diﬀerentiated; as in
Rochet and Tirole (2001), we assume that there exists an intense intra-network
competition resulting in constant equilibrium margins charged on merchants
5Issuing costs are generally higher than acquiring costs since they include the costs of
certain speciﬁc services oﬀered to cardholders; these services include: transaction processing,




1 = ¾ (cA + a) (2)
p
b¤
1 = ¯ (cI ¡ a) (3)
where ¾ and ¯ are constant and strictly greater than 1 and denote the de-
gree of intra-network competition between acquiring and issuing banks respec-
tively. This amounts to assume that members of the association are little
diﬀerentiated in a direction orthogonal to that of platform diﬀerentiation. In
a generalised model of Hotelling competition between platforms, the only ad-
missible equilibrium prices for platform 1 are given in (2) and (3). Platform 2
anticipates this, and sets its optimal prices.
2.3 Buyers’ behavior
We now derive buyer’s demand for the two platforms. The buyer’s beneﬁt
from consumption net of the price of the good, is independent from the mean
of payment used (cash or card) and without loss we assume this net utility
to be zero. Under these assumptions and given linear per-transaction prices,
adoption and usage decisions are equivalent and depends on the per transaction
cost of card usage.
Let k denote the transportation cost incurred by each consumer and let
Mj, j = 1;2 be the expected number of merchants operating on platform j.
Expressions (4) and (5) give the individual per-transaction utility from using












2 ¡ k(1 ¡ x) (5)
where pb
1 and pb
2 are the per transaction prices charged by issuing banks on
platform 1 and by platform 2 respectively and vb(¢) is a positive (weakly)
increasing function of the number of merchants on the other side of the market.
This functional form captures the idea that cardholders’ beneﬁts from hold-
ing a card are increasing in the expected number of merchants that accept the
card they own. A widespread card acceptance by sellers makes it easier for
the buyer to conclude a transaction, this eﬀect is introduced by the additive
term vb(¢)7. The presence of cross-markets eﬀects at the buyers and sellers
6With a slight abuse of notation, we have dropped the subscript i, i = 1;:::;N on pb
1
and imposed the equilibrium conditions given in (2) and (3).
7An alternative and more rigorous way of representing utilities would imply a slightly
diﬀerent speciﬁcation where the beneﬁt of a single transaction does not depend on the
9level is a well known feature of the credit card industry. The formal analysis of
these eﬀects requires one to make assumptions about the ability of banks and
platforms to aﬀect buyers and sellers expectations and then the derivation of
a fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium. The algebraic complexity of the model is
greatly simpliﬁed by assuming away such eﬀects at the customer level without
altering the basic economics of the system. The main analysis will be con-
ducted assuming vb as independent of the number of merchants adopting each
platform. In the last part of the paper we reintroduce cross-markets eﬀects
and show how the qualitative results remain largely unchanged.
Demand for platform 1 on the buyers’ side of the market is given by the






















We adopt a speciﬁcation of utility for sellers similar to that used for buyers;
the expected sellers’ utility from joining platform 1 or 2 is increasing in the












2 ¡ ± (1 ¡ x) (9)
where ps
i is the merchant discount charged on platform i and Ci is the expected
number of cardholders on the same platform. As for the buyers, for the mo-
ment, we assume away cross-markets eﬀects (that we will reintroduce in the
last part of the paper) and let vs be a positive constant.
The location of the merchant indiﬀerent between platform 1 and 2 gives
the merchants’ demand for platform 1; the remaining part of the segment is










number of merchants servicing the card whereas the total expected utility from owning a
card is directly aﬀected by Mi: Ub
1;i = (v¡pb
1;i¡kx)M1. We tried to use this speciﬁcation but
the added algebraic complexity did not allow to derive explicit solutions for the equilibrium











The two parameters ± and k reﬂect the degree of substitution between
the two platforms on the acquirers’ and issuers’ side respectively. The lower
their values the more intense the competition between platforms. Since we
are interested in the eﬀects of diﬀerent degrees of competition on the two
sides, we keep ± constant and equal to 1 and let k to vary. The parameter
k can then be interpreted as a relative measure of the degree of substitution
between platforms on the two sides of the market. This results in little loss
of generality because it turns out that, in equilibrium, the eﬀect of changes in
the two parameters are symmetric.
2.5 Platforms’ proﬁts
Each pair (buyer, seller) corresponds to a potential transaction; therefore the
total number of transactions on each platform is given by the product ci mi,
i = 1;2. Given the two expressions for platform 1 symmetric equilibrium
prices, (2) and (3), the total amount of proﬁts earned by acquiring and issuing
banks on platform 1 and proﬁts for platform 2 are:
¼a = ¾ (cA + a)c1 m1 (12)
¼i = ¯ (cI ¡ a)c1 m1 (13)
¼2 = (p
a
2 ¡ cA)c2m2 + (p
b
2 ¡ cI)c2 m2 (14)
where ci and mi are given in (6)-(11). Platform 1 total proﬁts can be written
as:
¼1 = H(a)c1m1 (15)
where
H(a) ´ (¾ ¡ ¯)a + (¯ ¡ 1)cI + (¾ ¡ 1)cA
is the per-transaction margin over total costs for platform 1. Clearly, if ¾ = ¯,
i.e. same degree of intra-platform competition on both sides of the market,
the per transaction margin is independent from the interchange fee while it
increases (resp. decreases) with the interchange fee if ¾ > ¯ (resp. <).
3 Equilibrium
3.1 The equilibrium for given interchange fee
Firms 2 maximises proﬁts taking a, pa¤
1 and ps¤
1 as given. From the usual ﬁrst
order conditions the optimal prices charged by platform 2 on the two sides, as










2 ¡ k + (1 ¡ ¯)cI + (1 + 2¾)cA + (¯ + 2¾)a
3
(17)
Using (3), (2), (16) and (17) we can derive the equilibrium total proﬁts for the
two platforms as a function of the interchange fee:
¼1(a) =




(H(a) + k + 1)3
108k
(19)
Visual inspection of the second stage proﬁt functions shows the following result:
Proposition 1. Suppose that platforms’ competition is described by the above
Hotelling model:
1. when intra-platform competition is symmetric (¾ = ¯), equilibrium plat-
forms’ proﬁts are independent of the interchange fee;
2. platform 2 proﬁts increase with the interchange fee if ¾ > ¯ and decrease
otherwise.
Although the proof of the proposition above is straightforward, the eco-
nomics behind it is not.
Consider an increase in the interchange fee; this produces the same qual-
itative eﬀects on the prices charged by the two platforms, raising merchants’
fees and lowering buyers’ fees. This is obvious for platform 1 prices while for
platform 2 it can be seen by taking the derivatives of expressions (16) and
(17) with respect to a: dpb
2(a)=da = ¡(2¯ + ¾)=3 and dps
2(a)=da = (¯+2¾)=3.
The two derivatives have opposite sign and the absolute value of the second is
larger than that of the ﬁrst if ¾ > ¯.
The impact of an increase in the interchange fee on platform 2 proﬁts’ is
clear: when ¾ > ¯, a reduction of the price margin on the buyers’ side is more
than compensated by the price increase on the merchants’ side and platform
proﬁts increase. For these same reasons, when ¯ > ¾, platform 2 proﬁts are
monotonically decreasing in the level of the interchange fee. When ¾ = ¯, the
two eﬀects cancel each other out; the net eﬀect of a change in a on proﬁts is
zero and this is true for both platforms.
This discussion shows how the setting of the interchange fee harms platform
2, reducing its proﬁts when certain conditions occur; indeed one of the main
12concerns of many regulatory authorities is that open systems like Visa may
actually use the interchange fee to foreclose the market. The following corollary
deals with this debated issue.
Corollary 1. Platform 1 cannot set the interchange fee so as to foreclose the
market.
All proof are in the Appendix.
3.2 The optimal interchange fee
In the ﬁrst stage platform 1, anticipating the second stage outcome, chooses
the interchange fee to maximise total proﬁts earned by banks participating
to its network. As mentioned we assume that side payments between issuing
and acquiring banks are not allowed; this implies that the optimal interchange
fee is constrained in the interval [¡cA;cI] to ensure non negative proﬁts for
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3(¯ ¡ 1)cI + 3(¾ ¡ 1)cA ¡ 4(k + 1) + R
¯ ¡ ¾
(20)
G ´ 1 +
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31 ¡ 46k + 31k2
Proposition 2. In the Hotelling model of platform competition, the optimal
interchange fee set by platform 1 is given by the following:






¡cA if ¯ ¸ G
aopt if ¯ < G < ¾ < G0
cI if ¾ ¸ G0






cI if ¾ ¸ G
aopt if ¾ < G < ¯ < G0
¡cA if ¯ ¸ G0
13The optimal interchange fee can assume both positive and negative val-
ues. Three variables crucially aﬀect a¤: the relative intensity of intra-platform
competition on the two sides of the market captured by the sign of (¾ ¡ ¯)
and the relative intensity of inter-platform competition measured by ± and k.
The next proposition states our main result concerning the role of the optimal
interchange fee. Deﬁne the price level on each platform as the sum of buyers’s
fee and merchants’ discount Pj = pb
j + ps
j, j = 1;2 and the same-side platform
price diﬀerential as ∆i = pi
1 ¡ pi
2, i = b;s.
Proposition 3. Let minf¾;¯g < G < maxf¾;¯g < G0. The optimal inter-
change fee sterilises the eﬀects of diﬀerent degrees of inter-platform competition
on the equilibrium price levels, price diﬀerentials, total quantities and platform
proﬁts.
This result is new. While previous papers have concentrated on the mo-
nopoly case or on competition between identical platforms, this Proposition
shows that the optimal interchange fee makes platform 1 immune from the de-
gree of competition between member banks on the issuing and acquiring side.
Total proﬁts for the platform will depend only on inter-platform competition,
summarised by the parameter k in the model. This result has interesting
consequences; what really matters is competition between rival platforms, in-
creasing competition within platforms is not associated with the usual eﬀects
on prices.
This also shows that non proprietary platforms have little incentive to im-
pose entry barriers to new banks into the system since the eﬀect of increased
intra-platform competition is neutralised by the choice of the interchange fee.
It should be noticed that the imposition of entry barriers by platforms is a
concern of several regulatory authorities. Our main message is that, whereas
for the issuing and acquiring banks the eﬀect of increased intra-platform com-
petition produces the obvious eﬀect of decreasing the bank’s individual proﬁts,
the total value of the platform, measured by the level of aggregate proﬁts re-
mains unchanged. Whether entry barriers are or are not lifted by open systems
depends, therefore, on the governance mechanisms of this type of platform.
It is interesting to note that buyer’s fees and merchants’ discounts do de-
pend on the conditions of market competition, both intra and inter-network;
it is the total price level on each platform that is kept constant by means of
the optimal interchange fee.
The competitive stance of platform 1 compared to platform 2 is not af-
fected by its internal competition, as the constant price diﬀerentials ∆i clearly
demonstrate. Market shares on both sides of the market are also independent
of the level of intra-platform competition. How the optimal interchange fee
accomplishes this role is described in the next corollary.
14Corollary 2. Let minf¾;¯g < G < maxf¾;¯g < G0. The optimal inter-
change fee a¤ exhibits the following properties:

























; if k > 1:43 the converse is
true.
When ¾ = ¯, acquiring and issuing banks face the same degree of compe-
tition; the indeterminacy of the optimal interchange fee results, in our model,
from the assumed symmetry of the intra-platform demand on the two sides of
the market. Claim 2. is related to the eﬀect of changes in the overall com-
petition within platform 1. The interchange fee is used by platform 1 as an
instrument to balance prices on the two sides of the market. An increase in
the overall degree of intra-platform competition (either ¾ and/or ¯ decrease)
is matched with a change in the interchange fee such that the price of the less
competitive side is increased. On the contrary, platform 1 reacts to a reduction
in the intra-platform degree of competition by lowering the price on the less
competitive side. The eﬀect on the price level P1 is zero, but the two prices
are pushed in opposite directions so as to keep them in balance.
Claim 3. is related to the eﬀect of inter-platform competition captured by
the parameter k. The eﬀect of changes in k on the optimal interchange fee
shows an intricate pattern. We identify a threshold level of k such that below
the threshold the sign of the derivative of a¤ with respect to k is the same as
the sign of ¾ ¡ ¯; above the threshold the sign of the derivative is reversed.
The basic intuition behind the result is the same as before: platform 1 uses a
in order to keep the two sides of the market balanced. To see this, consider the
following scenario. Start from k = ± = 1 and assume that ¾ > ¯. This implies
that inter-network competition has the same intensity on the two sides and
that the acquirers’ side is less (intra-network) competitive that the issuers’ side;
consequently acquirers earn higher margin than issuers, for a given interchange
fee. If k < ± = 1, then both intra-platform and inter-platform competition
are stronger on the issuers’ side. This depresses the price pb
1; to balance the
prices, following a reduction in k, platform 1 reduces a¤ thus increasing pb
1
and lowering ps
1. If ± = 1 < k < 1:43, inter-network competition is lower on
the issuer side but the eﬀect of ¾ > ¯ dominates so that a reduction in k
produces the same eﬀect on a¤. When k > 1:43, inter-network competition is
suﬃciently weak to dominate the eﬀect of stronger intra-platform competition
on the issuers’ side. In this range, a reduction in k prompts an increase in a¤
so as to reduce pb
1. Summing up, this analysis shows how the interchange fee
15is used to keep balanced the prices on the two sides of the market, irrespective
of the level of intra and inter-platform competition.
We conclude this discussion presenting the eﬀects on platform 2 proﬁts’
of a ban on the setting of the interchange fee by the not-for-proﬁt platform;
a scenario that has been envisaged in the regulatory proposal of the Reserve
Bank of Australia.
Proposition 4. The impact of a ban on the setting of an interchange fee on
platform 2 proﬁts is ambiguous.

















At the corner solutions,
¼2 (a = ¡cA) > ¼2(a = 0) () ¯ > ¾
and
¼2 (a = cI) > ¼2(a = 0) () ¾ > ¯
According to this result, regulations banning the setting of the interchange
fee may produce perverse eﬀects on the industry proﬁts. Whether or not these
will produce an increase in consumer surplus is a question for which our model
is not well suited. The point we make is that such regulations may not be
welcomed by all platforms.
4 The model with network eﬀects
In this section we reintroduce network eﬀects at the individual level for buyers
and sellers and we show that the basic economics of the model does not change
signiﬁcantly. The utility functions are those given in (4), (5) and (8), (9) and
we assume a linear speciﬁcation for the network eﬀects: vb(Mi) = tMi and
vs(Ci) = vCi, with i = 1;2, where the constant positive parameters t and v
measure the strength of network eﬀects.
The timing of the game remains unaltered. For each set of expectations,
that we assume to be identical for all buyers and sellers, there is a correspond-
ing equilibrium; the one we look at is derived imposing fulﬁlled expectations,
where the expected size of each side of the market is equal to the actual one.















1 ¡ t(C1 ¡ C2)
2±
c2 = 1 ¡ c1 m2 = 1 ¡ m1
For the sake of simplicity we consider here the case of symmetric inter-
platform competition, k = ± = 1 only. The optimal interchange fee is then
derived as above and is given by:
a
opt =
(¾ ¡ 1)cA + (¯ ¡ 1)cI
¯ ¡ ¾
+
12 ¡ 3(t + v)
(¯ ¡ ¾)(2(t + v) ¡ 9)
(21)
Clearly, for v = 0, t = 0, the above expression is equivalent to (20) with
k = 1. Proposition 3 holds, with the two conditions that ensure an interior
solution appropriately modiﬁed8. As in the previous case, price levels, price
diﬀerences and platform proﬁts are independent of the degree of intra-platform
competition. It can be shown that the equilibrium is characterised by the
following9:
P1 = c +
3(v + t) ¡ 12
2(v + t) ¡ 9
; P2 = c +
2(v + t) ¡ 10








2(v + t) ¡ 9
¼1 = 3
µ
v + t ¡ 4
2(v + t) ¡ 9
¶3
; ¼2 = 2
µ
v + t ¡ 5
2(v + t) ¡ 9
¶3
Price levels, price diﬀerences and platform proﬁts are instead aﬀected by net-
work eﬀects. It actually turns out that network eﬀects play a role similar to
that of the inter-platform diﬀerentiation parameters ± and k analysed in the
previous sections. Intra-platform competition is not aﬀected by the presence of
network eﬀects and, therefore, the immunisation result derived in Proposition
3 is still valid.
8In this case, G = G0 ´ 1 +
3(t+v)¡12
(2(t+v)¡9)c.
9We omit the formal derivation of the results for this case. The proofs run along similar
lines of those of previous sections. They are, however, available on request.
175 Conclusions
Our aim was to shed new light on the determinants and the competitive role
of the interchange fees set by not-for-proﬁt associations facing competition by
vertically integrated for-proﬁt systems. Previous literature, surveyed in the
introduction, has clariﬁed the balancing role of the interchange fee in ”getting
both sides of the market on board”. We show that the interchange fee can play
the additional strategic role of making the competitive position of the not-for-
proﬁt platform as opposed to the vertically integrated, independent from the
conditions of intra-platform competition. When the interchange fee is set so as
to maximise the sum of issuers’ and acquirers’ proﬁts, the equilibrium values
of platforms’ proﬁts, price levels and their market shares are independent of
the competitive conditions within the not-for-proﬁt platform and are aﬀected
by the strength of inter-platform competition.
Variations in the strength of competition, both inter and intra-platform,
aﬀect the level of the optimal interchange fee. An increase in the level of intra-
platform competition, generating either from the issuers’ or the acquirers’ side,
induces a change in the optimal interchange fee that increases the price of the
less competitive side. This implies that if, for example, the acquirers’ side is
less competitive than the issuers’ side, a further increase of competition will
lead to an increase of the optimal interchange fee.
If inter-platform competition is not too asymmetric on the two sides, changes
in its level produce the same eﬀects on the optimal level of the interchange
fee as those discussed above for intra-platform competition. Finally we show
that a ban on the setting of the interchange fee by not-for-proﬁt platform may
harm its vertically integrated competitor.
The simple model we use does not lend itself to a rigorous welfare analysis;
therefore we did not dwelled into the welfare properties of the equilibrium.
This is a serious limitation of our model which we are trying to extend in
order to accomodate this type of analysis.
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19Appendix.
Proof. of Corollary 1. Suppose that ¯ > ¾. In this case, platform 2 proﬁts’
decrease with a; for an interchange fee above a certain level, platform 2 makes
negative proﬁts (foreclosure). From (19) it is easy to see that ¼2 · 0 if
a ¸
k + 1 + (¯ ¡ 1)cI + (¾ ¡ 1)cA
¯ ¡ ¾
Clearly, this level of the interchange fee cannot be ﬁxed by platform 1 since
it is always grater than cI. Similar arguments can be applied when ¾ > ¯; in
this the level of the interchange fee which forecloses the market is always lower
than ¡cA and cannot be chosen by platform 1.
Proof. of Proposition 2. The solution to the unconstrained maximisation prob-










and it is clearly satisﬁed for all values of k. To complete the proof we need
to verify i) under which conditions the constraints are satisﬁed and ii) the
optimality conditions at the corners. Let us start with i) and assume that
¾ > ¯; we need to check when aopt < cI and aopt > ¡cA. The ﬁrst inequality
holds for: ¾ > G, the second condition requires ¯ < G. When one of the two is
violated, the correspondent constraint binds. When ¯ > ¾ things are reversed.
In order to check the optimality conditions at the corners, use (18) to compute
platform 1 proﬁts when a = ¡cA, a = cI and a = aopt:
¼1(¡cA) = (¯ ¡ 1)c
[(¯ ¡ 1)c ¡ 5k + 1][(¯ ¡ 1)c ¡ 5 + k]
36k
;
¼1(cI) = (¾ ¡ 1)c




(R ¡ 4(k + 1))(11k ¡ 7 + R)(7k ¡ 11 ¡ R)
972k
;
Start from ¾ > ¯; it is easy to verify that in this case ¼1(cI) > ¼1(¡cA).
Therefore we need to contrast ¼1(cI) vs ¼1(aopt); simple calculations show that
for ¾ > G0 proﬁts of platform 1 are higher at the corner (a = cI) than when
setting a = aopt. Similar, but reversed, arguments apply when ¯ > ¾.
20Proof. of Proposition 3. The proof is very straightforward. Using (20) into
the expressions for price levels Pj, gives the following:
P1 = c +
4(k + 1) ¡ R
3
P2 = c +
7(k + 1) ¡ R
9
which show that the price levels are a constant margin above total costs.
Equilibrium price diﬀerentials are:
∆
b =




7k ¡ 2 ¡ R
9
Finally equilibrium platform proﬁts (18) and (19) become:
¼1 =
(R ¡ 4(k + 1))(11k ¡ 7 + R)(7k ¡ 11 ¡ R)
972k
; ¼2 =
(7(k + 1) ¡ R)
3
2916k
As for quantities, the result easily follows from what we have already shown.
Proof. of Corollary 2. Claim 1. is clear from (20). To show claim 2. diﬀeren-













It follows immediately that the numerator is positive in both cases so that the
sign of the derivative is given by the sign of denominator.











The term in square brackets is positive (negative) for k < 1:43 (k > 1:43);
therefore the sign of the derivative is given by the sign of (¾ ¡ ¯) if k < 1:43
and by the opposite sign otherwise.
21Proof. of Proposition 4. From (19) and (20), ¼2 (a = aopt) > ¼2(a = 0) if




[7(k + 1) + R]
3
2916k
Getting rid of the power, dividing both parts by 3(cA + cI) and rearranging,




The right hand side of this inequality is a weighted average of ¾ and ¯; therefore
¾cA+¯cI
cA+cI 2 [minf¾;¯g;maxf¾;¯g]. When G >
¾cA+¯cI
cA+cI , ¼2 (a = aopt) > ¼2(a = 0),
when G <
¾cA+¯cI
cA+cI , then the reverse is true. The rest of the proof is straight-
forward; substituting for a = ¡cA and a = cI in the proﬁt function (19) and
comparing with the equilibrium proﬁts for a = aopt yields the result.
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